Case 2:15-cr-20652-GCS-DRG ECF No. 1416 filed 05/09/19 PageID.18665 Page 1 of 18

STEVEN SCHARG, ESQ. On behalf of Keithon Porter <u>To Obtain Certified Transcript, Contact:</u> Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, Official Court Reporter Theodore Levin United States Courthouse 231 West Lafayette Boulevard, Room 1067 Detroit, Michigan 48226 (313) 962-1234 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription. 

Detroit, Michigan

Monday, August 13, 2018

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(Proceedings held without defendants and jury.)

THE COURT: So the Court has been presented the proposed jury instructions in the case with two issues that were given to the Court to decide.

I have to say that I think you did a wonderful job in developing the instructions to be delivered to the jury. Much as difficult and as complex as it could have been, I think you have made the -- structured the instructions in a way that is relatively simple, and understandable for the jury address.

Addressing the two matters that you were not able to conclude, the defendants object to instructions relating to the sentencing enhancement questions that are given to the jury, and specifically to the instructions that direct the jury to consider whether the defendant or a conspirator attempted to -- to kill, for example, at Page 32 of the current version of the instructions.

Actually, it would involve the question of whether first degree premeditated murder was a -- and the elements of that would apply to the defendant or a conspirator caused

by the death of another person in light of the elements are based upon Michigan law, and the defense argument was that the Michigan law would require the jury to conclude attribution of the acts to the defendant only, not to the defendant or a conspirator as set forth in the proposed instructions to the jury.

The Court agreed with the arguments by the government that this statement of the elements of the offense constitute the identifying the scope and reach of the agreement that the conspiracy that is alleged to be — to have been committed, and it could be a third person altogether, or other members of the conspiracy involved, but it is not an act that needs to be tied to the defendant in any case, and to eliminate the language or the conspirator in that instruction would mislead the jury to believe they are required to tie the acts — the act of commission of the first degree murder to the main defendant involved in this enhancement alone.

So I'm sure you want to articulate the same arguments better than what the Court just did.

MR. WIGOD: I think the Court stated the government's argument properly, that given that it is a RICO conspiracy, I think it's not required that a particular defendant committed the underlying racketeering act. So the instruction should include the defendant or a

conspirator. If it were to state that if a defendant caused -- in this case, for example, premeditated murder -- if it were to state the defendant caused the death, I think that would confuse the jury and is not an accurate statement of what's required in the RICO conspiracy.

THE COURT: I know Mr. Daly, you can restate your argument much better than I did.

MR. DALY: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. DALY: Yes, like I'm agreeing with what you just said. Yes, I acknowledge I should go forward next.

We specifically object the phrase or a conspirator because the government has charged the RICO conspiracy, and in the elements of the RICO conspiracy, they layout what the jury has to find, which is a conspiracy or agreement between a defendant and a conspirator, but they've charged specific subjective crimes, and they picked first degree premeditated murder in one of the racketeering activity, and they don't correctly state Michigan law. Michigan law does not allow a conviction for first degree premeditated murder if the defendant or a conspirator committed any of the elements that are listed in the proposed instruction.

If you read the first paragraph of racketeering activity, it clearly tells the jury, racketeering activity applied in the RICO statute includes specific types of crimes under state or federal law.

So then they go onto instruct the jury about Michigan law by misleading the jury that it includes or a conspirator, and the next sentence, Count 1 of the indictment, alleges that the defendant agreed that the specific crime of racketeering activity, the following types committed.

So the jury is told that there's an agreement to commit these substantive crimes, but then allows the jury to convict the defendant even though the elements of first degree premeditated murder is with regards with the individual defendant. It's the or a conspirator phrase that we object to, Judge.

THE COURT: Yes. And again, I look at this as a summary description of the four elements that represent the elements required to be proven, but to render one guilty of premeditated murder, and the reference to defendant or a conspirator causing the death is an accurate statement of the liability in light of the fact that we're looking at the agreement -- of the agreement represented in this conspiracy, which would not require success in the commission of the murder, or

require the defendant alone to be responsible for the offense.

MR. DALY: But the same language that we're talking about shows up in the other racketeering activity, robbery, witness intimidation.

I just want to point out that when it comes to controlled substances, they charge both the substantive and the conspiracy racketeering. That's what I'm talking about.

So it you read through all of these other racketeering activities, it actually distinguishes between a substantive offense and a conspiracy. So that just furthers my argument. Sorry to interrupt you.

THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. So I think we've staked out our positions on that subject.

And then the second issue, also objected by defense counsel, was with respect to the verdict form, and again, these are in connection with the sentencing enhancement questions posed, which are broken out defendant by defendant.

And the first of those enhancement questions reads: Did defendant, between July 14, 2014 through September 26, 2015, agree that he or another conspirator assault rival gang members with the intent to commit murder, yes or no.

And the second question: Did defendant commit, or cause to be committed, or aid and abet in the commission of the attempted murder, in paren, assault with intent to murder of Derrick Peterson, Darnell Canady or Jason Gaskin on or about May 10, 2015.

The objection made by defense counsel is that the period of -- by mentioning only the period of the conspiracy without identifying the specific dates of assaults on rival gang members is too ambiguous to effectively address by the defense, that sort of a due process argument, I suppose, although I don't think it was identified as such by Mr. Scharg who was arguing the case.

The Court ended up agreeing with the government as it relates to this issue, given the fact that we're talking about a conspiracy, and the unlawful agreement that is at the heart of the conspiracy is certainly clearly identified in the proofs of the case that has been presented through the witnesses thus far, and the jury needs only to find one instance -- I guess I should say that actually, as it's -- I'm trying to recall the government's response to the argument. Mr. Wigod?

MR. WIGOD: Judge, it is our position that what's in the indictment adequately gives the defendant notice of what the enhancement involves. It states what the statute violation is. It states that they are

conspiring. It states when they are conspiring, the date range. It explains the object of the conspiracy, and who they are trying to assault.

So it is rather narrow in the time frame that they are going to commit an assault or conspiring to commit an assault, and who the committed the assault against, and as you mentioned, that notice is -- has to be viewed in context of what the proofs were at trial. We're not going to argue anything that was not established at trial.

This is a conspiracy. So identifying the specific date and time when the conspiracy started is not necessary in these circumstances. So I think it provides more than adequate notice of what the situation is when you review the context of what the proofs were during the trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Again -- well, I'll hear Mr. Scharg.

MR. H. SCHARG: I just want to say that the Court has summarized, you know, my argument which really falls under the due process argument.

The only thing that I would like to add is that in the indictment, specifically the sixth superseding indictment, it doesn't give notice -- you know, there's no overt acts in reference to the specific acts that the government alleges would fall in the category of the enhancement, meaning that there's no reference in the

overt acts as to Mr. Fisher's video regarding dropping an opp or the reference to going hunting.

So of all the overt acts, there were over 100 of them, none of those overt acts in Count 1 address those acts that they are using for the enhancement. So it's a due process argument, and I believe it was not properly notified as to those acts in the defendant's case.

THE COURT: Okay. So again, this is similar to the only other issue that was presented to the Court for a decision, in that the enhancement is going to be considered by the jury in the summary form that it is — that is identified in presenting these two issues for a decision, because we do have named individuals who were identified as the objects of the attempted murder, and we have a summary description to the defendant or another conspirator to assault rival gang members with the intent to commit murder.

It's apparent from the body of the evidence in the case that these are the issues that we're dealing with, and I don't think anything more than a description that is made in these two questions to be presented to the jury is sufficient, and the defendants have enjoyed a sufficient opportunity to identify and to defend the evidence presented in the case that the government is relying on in the presentation of its arguments to the jury.

So it is a question for the parties to deal with in the argument, and I think sufficiently identify to protect the rights of the defendant to understand what they're charged with.

So the Court is going to again side with the government as it relates to those enhancement questions.

Anything else on the subject?

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MR. H. SCHARG: I apologize. I can't get pacer in the room here, but there's some reference --

MR. H. SCHARG: There's a reference in the prior trial that there were separate verdicts forms for each of them, was that true?

THE COURT: Keep your voice up, Henry.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. H. SCHARG: My question is if there were separate verdict forms in that case, why do we not have separate verdict forms for the defendants in this case?

THE COURT: The short answer is there are a lot of other things that are different about the form in this case, and I think the short answer from the Court's perspective is that this is a -- broken out in a way that is simple and easier to understand by the jury than the first jury verdict form was.

And the second answer is that this was something that I assumed you all worked out based on the fact that

1	that's the only issue raised here.
2	MR. H. SCHARG: Not necessarily. I mean
3	THE COURT: I mean, we sent you a copy of the
4	verdict form.
5	MR. WIGOD: This is the first the government
6	heard of it. I don't how it make a difference.
7	MR. H. SCHARG: It's a big difference, even
8	in terms of the optics.
9	MR. FEINBERG: It gives the jury a clearer
10	picture of each defendant.
11	MR. H. SCHARG: These are separate trials.
12	MR. WIGOD: We're not doing individual
13	trials.
14	MR. DALY: But you're breaking it up.
15	MR. WIGOD: Let me see. I'll take a look at
16	it.
17	THE COURT: I'm happy to revert to that form
18	also if you agree on it.
19	I'm going to, given the complexity of the
20	instructions, I'm incline to give each juror a full set of
21	the instructions.
22	MR. FEINBERG: We're talking about separate
23	verdict forms for each defendant.

separate set instructions for each juror.

MR. WIGOD: The Judge is talking about a

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MR. FEINBERG: Oh, yes. 1 2 THE COURT: I was going to deliver them a 3 copy to follow as I'm reading. It might enhance their comprehension as well. 4 So the short answer is you're going to take a 5 look at --6 7 MR. WIGOD: I'll take a look at it. Unless 8 there's a problem, I don't have an issue with it. 9 THE COURT: Okay. So we've had other 10 clerical errors and things that you discussed this 11 morning? 12 MR. WIGOD: Yes. We had agreed to make some 13 changes. I don't know if they need to go on the record. 14 I'll be sending a new copy over to the defense, and if I 15 missed anything, they will let me know. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. SPIELFOGEL: So far you have made the 18 corrections. 19 THE COURT: So if we are going to make all these copies, we need to get going on it this afternoon. 20 21 MR. WIGOD: We won't be reading tomorrow, right? I mean, I'll get it done as soon as I can, but 22 23 hopefully --24 MR. BILKOVIC: We don't think we'll finish 25 closing until Wednesday.

1	MR. FEINBERG: Have we decided a time
2	schedule for tomorrow?
3	MR. DALY: We talked about it.
4	THE COURT: So I told them to be here by
5	nine.
6	Another question, are we going to wait until all
7	of the defense closings are in before the government
8	responds, or is the government going to want to go
9	defendant by defendant?
10	MR. SPIELFOGEL: I've never seen that.
11	MR. BILKOVIC: That would be awesome. I will
12	make on blanket rebuttal at the end, but if the Court
13	wants to give me that opportunity
14	MR. FEINBERG: If that's way it is the
15	defendant who is not being responded to by Mark, we can
16	leave the court and the attorneys leave and come back?
17	THE COURT: Yeah, right.
18	MR. BILKOVIC: It's just going to be one.
19	MR. THEIS: How many do you think we'll get
20	done tomorrow?
21	MR. BILKOVIC: I don't know how long you guys
22	will be, but I think Julie will be two, two and a half
23	hours. I don't know, Judge, but would you be incline if
24	Julie is an hour in, to give a five minute break?
25	THE COURT: Oh, yeah. Of course.

1	MR. BILKOVIC: Okay. So depending on how
2	long you guys are going. How long do you plan to give the
3	jury for lunch if going to 12 or 12:30?
4	THE COURT: An hour maybe, because we can
5	order the food in for them, so they don't have to leave.
6	MR. WIGOD: We'll be done by lunch time.
7	MR. DALY: I'm going first and last, and
8	depending how far they are, I may ask for an early lunch
9	or later. We'll see how it goes. I'll be about an hour.
10	MR. BILKOVIC: I think it's reasonable that
11	once Julie does her
12	MR. DALY: We'll need break.
13	MR. THEIS: Are we going to four?
14	THE COURT: Yes.
15	MR. THEIS: Three at least.
16	MR. H. SCHARG: Can we agree to do the
17	government's closing, and then maybe three defense
18	closings, and and the of defense closing on Wednesday,
19	and rebuttal on Wednesday?
20	THE COURT: Yeah, that sounds like
21	MR. BILKOVIC: If the Court is okay, that
22	would be great. That would allow us to better time
23	everything, it doesn't rush Julie who goes tomorrow first,
24	then three defense arguments, and then the last two and
25	rebuttal.

1	MR. MAGIDSON: Instruction on Wednesday?
2	THE COURT: Sure.
3	MR. FEINBERG: How long do you think you will
4	be?
5	MR. BILKOVIC: Depends on how long you are.
6	MR. FEINBERG: How long?
7	MR. BILKOVIC: Without knowing, maybe
8	somewhere around an hour.
9	THE COURT: Okay. We'll touch base at some
10	point later today and make sure you got the stuff.
11	MR. FEINBERG: Thank you for breakfast.
12	THE COURT: You're welcome.
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14	(Proceedings concluded.)
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1 CERTIFICATION

I, Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, official court reporter for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause on the date hereinbefore set forth.

I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction.

s/Ronald A. DiBartolomeo Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, CSR Official Court Reporter \_\_May 9, 2019 Date